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Henry Wallace and
the Farm Crisis of
the 1920s and 1930s
LAUREN SOTH
Í\MERICAN AGRICULTURE slumped in economic depression most
of the time between the world wars. In these two decades an en-
tirely new relationship was created between farming and urban
society and government. Henry Agard Wallace of the Iowa
Wallaces was the undisputed intellectual and political leader of
this change. To understand the place of Henry Wallace in the
evolving political economy of agriculture during the interwar
years, we must first transfer ourselves mentally back in time
sixty years. That's quite a difficult journey, considering how
much American life has been altered—even for those of us
senescent citizens who lived through those decades.
The first thing to recall is that nearly one-third of the
people of the United States lived on farms—less than 3 percent
do so today. There were óVz million farms as compared with
under IV2 million today. These large changes in numbers actu-
ally understate the radical nature of the upset in organization of
agriculture from then to now. At least two-thirds of today's IV2
million farms are operated by part-time farmers whose families
get more of their income from nonfarm sources than from sale
of farm products. Most of these "farmers" more accurately
would be called factory workers, lawyers, teachers, carpenters,
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or insurance salespersons. If the census definition of a farm were
increased from the current $1,000 worth of sales of farm prod-
ucts per year to $2,500, the number of farms would be reduced
by a million. Furthermore, the business of the remaining lVz
million farms is heavily concentrated in the larger business
units. Half a million farms produce and sell 85 percent of the
farm products in commercial channels.
The large-scale, industrialized farm had not arrived in 1921
when Henry Cantwell Wallace became United States secretary
of agriculture and his son, Henry A., became editor of Wallaces'
Farmer. There were some big wheat farms on the Plains and a
few large cotton establishments in the South. But agriculture
was made up almost entirely of small to middle-sized, truly
family-size farms. The horse was king of farm power. The
difference between farm and city in those days was a vast gulf.
Farm families were isolated from urban living, mostly without
plumbing, electricity, and public services of all kinds including
hard-surfaced roads. Farm families provided much of their own
food, fuel, clothing, and entertainment. They were less com-
mercialized and more self-sustaining. They didn't buy fertilizer,
pesticides, seed, and factory-blended livestock feeds. This is the
kind of agricultural society in which the Wallaces, beginning
with the revered Uncle Henry, patriarch of the family, had risen
to leadership. In preparing the way for a discussion of Henry A.
Wallace's pre-eminent career in guiding public policy about
agricultural affairs, one must sketch the family foundations on
which he built.
Henry Wallace, "Uncle Henry," the grandfather, and
Henry Cantwell Wallace, the father, were traditional Republi-
cans, somewhat maverick-ish though. In the early twentieth
century, they often lined up on the progressive or liberal side of
the party. But they believed in the protective tariff and in
"sound money." Uncle Henry, a contemporary of James Baird
Weaver and William Jennings Bryan, stoutly opposed their
easy-credit, soft-money, monetization-of-silver policies. Yet
considering his fierce opposition to business monopoly, railroad
management, the middlemen, the meat packers, and the grain
trade—malefactors on the Populists' hit list—one would have
expected Uncle Henry to agree on money and tariffs. All the
Henry Wallaces were backers of Theodore Roosevelt in the 1912
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election; their devotion to the Republican party was not as
strong as their devotion to the progressive policies of Roosevelt
on conservation, trust busting, and aid for farmers.
Young Henry or "H.A.," to distinguish him from H. C , or
Harry, began his lifelong study of the economic aspects of farm-
ing soon after he graduated from Iowa State College in 1910 and
started work on the family newspaper. During the war he
developed a set of cost-price ratios, relating the price of corn to
the price of hogs, for example, to publish as guides for farmers
in planning production. When the United States entered the war
in 1917, President Wilson appointed Herbert Hoover as food
administrator and Hoover named H. C. Wallace as head of an
advisory committee on pork supply which was running short of
the wartime demands. Hoover attempted to meet the problem
with a propaganda campaign, appealing to the farmers' patrio-
tism to raise more hogs. Wallace argued that farmers needed
financial incentive and based his proposal to Hoover on the
hog-corn ratio worked out by his son. He said the price ratio
needed to be 13 to 1 (per hundred-weight of hogs to bushels of
com) if the required pork was to be produced. Hoover opposed
this idea at the start but later said he would "try" to stabilize the
price of hogs at the 13 to 1 ratio. Wallace and most farmers took
this as a promise, and when the Food Administration quit trying
to keep hog prices at the desired level in the fall of 1916, they
thought they had been betrayed. This was the beginning of a
long period of antagonism between the Wallaces and Hoover,
intensified when Harry Wallace and Hoover found themselves
on the Harding cabinet together.
An interesting evolution of thought took place in the
Wallace family during Henry C. Wallace's tenure as Harding's
secretary of agriculture. The secretary of agriculture began to
lose faith in the protective tviff for agriculture. Early in the ad-
ministration he had supported an increase in farm-product
tariffs, a campaign promise of President Harding and the
Republican party. But gradually he came to see the absurdity of
tariffs providing protection for commodities that were exported
in large quantity, such as wheat. Very little corn was exported
at that time, but the foreign market for corn converted into
pork and lard was vital to corn belt farmers. The sharp decline
in exports to Europe after the close of the war had put crushing
pressure on farm commodity prices.
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Probably the strongest influence on the secretary was his
oldest son, who had long since concluded that the protective
tariff system was injurious to agriculture. It increased the cost of
manufactured goods farmers bought and hurt farm exports by
limiting foreign dollar supplies. After the war, America's transi-
tion from a major debtor nation into the world's largest creditor
nation strengthened Henry A. Wallace's argument for low
tariffs: Foreign debtors of the United States could not pay their
debts unless they could earn dollars by selling goods to
America. Moreover, they would have to severely curtail their
purchase of American products in order to save dollars for pay-
ing war debts. Like John Maynard Keynes, Henry A. thought
the heavy reparations would force the Germans into crippling
reductions of their imports—including agricultural goods from
the United States.
One of Harry Wallace's first objectives as secretary was to
convene a conference of farm and business leaders to examine
the crisis facing farmers. Commodity prices crashed after the
war and land prices were following in a tumult. Many farmers
had bought land on the wave of optimism that came with soar-
ing prices during the war. "This is only the beginning," farmers
would say. "Our good land is all taken up; populations are
growing; you can't lose on land investment." But they could. In
their editorials in the late war years, the Wallaces were advising
farmers to pay off debts. They warned about a coming price
crash, such as the one that followed the Napoleonic wars. But
few listened. When prices of corn and hogs collapsed, while
mortgage payments and interest remained fixed, bankruptcies
and foreclosures spread like wildfire.
The new secretary thought something should be done
about farm credit and the prices of farm products. Harding was
not enthusiastic about calling a conference and making a big
thing out of the farmers' plight. Hoover and Andrew Mellon in
the cabinet were opposed, also. But one day after persistent
pressure from his agriculture secretary, the good-natured presi-
dent gave in. At the finish of a game of golf, which Wallace and
Harding often played together, the president said, "Go ahead
with your agricultural conference. Hank." This was the in-
auguration of the famous Agricultural Outlook Conferences
which have been held by the USDA annually ever since. It also
198
Farm Crisis/Soth
was the beginning of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and
attention to economics in the USDA, which had been wholly
devoted to improving farm production.
Harry Wallace had helped organize and lead the Corn Belt
Meat Producers Association as early as 1905 and had been the
permanent executive secretary until he became secretary of agri-
culture. Then he turned over the job to his oldest son, seemingly
by right of primogeniture. The organization originated mainly
as a pressure group to fight for lower freight rates for livestock
but became an advocacy group on broader issues affecting corn
belt farmers. Naturally, the Corn Belt Meat Producers Associa-
tion was invited to the outlook conference. A. Sykes, the long-
time president of the group, was scheduled to address the
meeting. The elder Wallace, having doubts about Sykes's ability
to write a good speech, asked his son to help Sykes prepare one.
Henry A. wrote a slashing attack on the protective tariff bill
then in the Senate Finance Committee. When the father saw the
text, he told his son the tariff comment would never do and
would have to be deleted—and it was. As editor of Wallaces'
Farmer, however, Henry A. had the full speech set in type and
printed for the next edition before he left for Washington. The
attack on the administration's tariff bill appeared in the paper
soon after the conference closed. Although the senior Wallace
had disavowed any connection with the paper's editorial policy
when he took office, Harding was not pleased about this
criticism which seemed to come from his own cabinet. The
agriculture secretary's only comment to his son, however, was,
"Henry, have a heart."
This episode marked a turning point in national agricul-
tural policy to emphasize international affairs and was premoni-
tory of the world viewpoint of Henry A. Wallace throughout
his life. As the 1920s wore on, with depressed farm prices, stag-
nant export trade, and building surpluses, the young editor of
Wallaces' Farmer continued to hammer on the stupidity of
American foreign trade policies.
At the first outlook conference the farm groups disagreed
on the issue of fixing prices of agricultural products. The fiery
John Simpson, then president of the Oklahoma Farmers Union
and later national president of the Union, wanted the govern-
ment to peg prices at cost of production. Harry Wallace and the
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Farm Bureau were strongly opposed. This was the beginning of
a long battle between farm groups about price fixing versus
other means of raising prices of farm products. The conference
also was the start of the movement to gain for farmers "fair ex-
change value" for their products—the birth of the parity idea.
George Peek of the Moline Plow Company spoke in favor of
doing this by means of a two-price plan, dumping farm
surpluses overseas in order to maintain a domestic fair-exchange
price. That was the origin of the McNary-Haugen bills that were
introduced in the middle twenties and vetoed twice by President
Coolidge.
A book on agricultural prices by Henry A. Wallace, pub-
lished in 1920, attracted much interest in the farmers' price
problem. The book dealt with cost-price ratios and used mul-
tiple correlations to analyze and explain agricultural pricing.
Wallace said that "so far as farmers are concerned, the object of
studies of this kind is, first, to play the price game as well as
capital and labor; and second, to cooperate with capital and
labor to enforce prices roughly equivalent to cost of production
to the end that supply and demand may operate more
smoothly."
The first outlook conference set the stage in the struggle for
what was called in those days "farm relief." The attitude of the
Republican administrations in the twenties was negative.
Hoover and Harding favored government action only to help
farmers organize and develop better marketing programs. But in
this conference, held under a Republican administration, many
farm policy ideas sprouted that were put into practice later in
the New Deal—all except production control which everybody
was trying to avoid.
HENRY A. WALLACE, the dedicated internationalist, was leery
of export dumping as well as of protective tariffs. But as the
farm depression worsened he began to accept the plan invented
by George Peek and Hugh Johnson of the Moline Plow Com-
pany for an agricultural export organization to dispose of
United States farm surpluses abroad. Anything that offered
some promise of farm relief and broke the ideological barrier
against government action became more palatable to both con-
servatives and liberals, free traders and nationalists alike.
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Out of a background of agrarian traditionalism and conser-
vatism, Henry A. Wallace grew more and more into pragma-
tism, less hidebound by ideology than his father and grand-
father who themselves were far from being rigid ideologues. He
was willing to try new schemes that seemed practical in an
economic sense and workable politically. He was skeptical of
radical economic plans that he felt would disrupt the capitalistic
system. He sensed as keenly as any politician ever has that
whatever the government did had to be acceptable to a large
preponderance of the people or it would fail.
During the last half of the 1920s Wallaces' Farmer settled on
McNary-Haugenism as the practical vehicle for dealing with the
mounting surpluses and depressed finances of agriculture. In the
May 25, 1928 issue of the paper, as the legislation was on the
verge of passing Congress for the last time, the editor printed
the text of the bill. The accompanying story described the plan:
"It provides that the surplus may be bought up, dumped
abroad, stored or disposed of in any way to get it off the home
market and so bring up the home market price. The loss in-
volved in this operation is to be met by an equalization fee
levied on the units of the commodity benefited."
Note the use of the word "dumped" which was not con-
sidered pejorative by the editor at that stage of the struggle for
farm equality. In his editorials, Wallace often spoke of the
McNary-Haugen plan and other similar proposals as ways to
"make the protective tariff effective for agriculture." This ra-
tionalization enabled Republicans, who were deeply committed
to the party's protective tariff philosophy, to justify their sup-
port for farm relief. They could be in favor of tariffs for
manufacturers and at the same time be in favor of compensa-
tory action to make the tariff effective for farmers, without ap-
pearing to violate the GOP faith. Making the tariff effective
became the premier slogan of the farm relief advocates. This
propaganda line and the visible distress of farmers in the
Republican districts of the North swung many Republican
congressmen onto the McNary-Haugen bandwagon.
But Coolidge vetoed the bill for the second time. In the next
edition of Wallaces' Farmer, June 1, the editor ran nine editori-
als about the iniquity of the veto and a tenth on how farmers
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ought to get out and vote in the primary election to show their
feelings about the matter.
Henry Wallace made the equalization-fee principle the
main issue of the campaign for entry of the federal government
into supply management for agriculture. In a speech sponsored
by the League of Women Voters on NBC network radio a
month earlier, he had said, "Thoughtful farmers are anxious to
borrow the centralizing power of government . . . but they do
not want to raid the Treasury . . . because they do not believe
in subsidy. They want to pay for this kind of thing by them-
selves by means of an equalization fee." Intervention of the
government into the private business of farming, he said, was
necessary because of the protective tariff and the power of large
corporations. This was a theme that he continued to stress
throughout the New Deal years and later. "I see much merit,"
Wallace said, "in applying the ideals of old-fashioned democ-
racy, greatly lowering the tariff on manufactured products,
opening up our gates to immigration, taking away all possible
favors from our large corporations and doing everything else
possible to restore a primitive state of competition."
Another factor contributing to the surplus of farm produc-
tion, Wallace thought, was the single-minded promotion of pro-
duction efficiency by the land-grant agricultural colleges and
the USDA, ignoring the over-supply problem and neglecting
economic research and education. In his May 1928, NBC radio
network address, he indulged in this sarcastic comment:
The state and federal governments are spending 100 million
dollars a year to make our farmers more efficient. . . . They are
guilty of the grossest negligence if they do not face the problem
thus created. . . . If this continues another 10 years, I would not
be surprised . . . to see many farmers rise up in their anger and
demand that the government spend its money on making city
people efficient rather than farmers.
This remark and similar comments in his writings made Wallace
not the most popular of farm editors among the presidents and
deans of the agricultural colleges.
At this same time, of course, Wallace was perfecting his
own experiments in hybrid corn and in 1926 had started his own
seed business to improve the efficiency of the corn growers. He
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saw no inconsistency in farm research to improve production
and the creation of unwieldy surpluses which depressed prices,
despite his sardonic jab about making city people more efficient
rather than farmers. Apparently, what he meant was that the
colleges should study ways and means to balance supply and
demand in addition to their work on production methods.
Maybe, he suggested, we should have the government buy up
the poor farmland which was then in crops and plant it to trees
and grass. That marks another plank in the Wallace platform
for agriculture that runs through his editorship and political ac-
tivity. In this, we may be sure, he was drawing on the em-
bedded philosophy of his grandfather about a permanent farm-
ing system. It fit in well with the need to reduce production, as
viewed by the grandson in 1928.
We see in the "writings and speeches of Henry Wallace in
the year 1928 the analysis and arguments on which the New
Deal in farming was based: The protective tariff system and an
inward-looking, nationalistic economic policy had brought
agriculture to financial disaster. The large corporations, with
their power over industrial prices abetted by the tariff, were
able to squeeze the Iifeblood out of free-market farming. The
logical and best solution would be to strike down the tariff
walls, provide credit for foreign buyers of farm products, and
restore a competitive economy. That being impossible, then
agriculture needed "the centralizing power of government" to
manage its own supplies and raise prices. Finally, government
should help farmers to protect the nation's soil resources and to
improve their marketing through cooperatives and better credit
institutions. Production control was in the wind, but at the time
of the 1928 presidential election it got little attention.
1 HE EDITOR of Wallaces' Farmer in 1928 was still tentative
about political party preference. The family paper had long dis-
avowed party allegiance and did not support candidates for
election. As late as September 1928, the editor was cautious
about alienating his Republican readers, although he and the
Corn Belt Committee, a joint lobby group of farm leaders in
which Wallace was active, had been saying favorable things
about Al Smith and the Democrats, because the Democrats had
expressed support for the McNary-Haugen idea in their
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Houston convention. (Hoover and the GOP remained op-
posed.)
Wallace illustrated his political caution in a speech to the
Iowa Farmers Union convention. He said, "I honestly think that
Hoover will carry Iowa by 200,000 votes. In view of that I think
it would be a fine thing for farmers who are thinking about the
welfare of Iowa agriculture, if they would plunk their votes
solidly for Smith, in view of the fact that there is that much
margin." He was peeved when the Des Moines Register quoted
him as saying, "The farmer of the United States can best serve
his own ends by throwing his influence to Governor Alfred E.
Smith for president." He seems to have been insistent on making
clear that the only reason he suggested voting for Al Smith was
that Hoover would carry the state anyway.
Readers of Wallaces' Farmer must have realized that the
editor favored the Democrats on the basis of farm policy, but
prohibition was a big issue, too. On November 2, the paper's
last pre-election editorial weighed the farm relief and prohibi-
tion issues, obviously favoring the Democrats on the former
and expressing fear that the eastern press and the politicians
would think that Iowa farmers supported Hoover's farm policy
even if they were voting for his keep-prohibition policy. The
editor said the big question was whether a large majority for
Hoover would help or hurt the farm campaign in Congress. He
clearly thought it would hurt.
From 1928 to 1932 the farm economic situation declined
alarmingly as the entire commercial world crumbled into what
was been called ever since the Great Depression. Wallace rea-
lized that programs to store or dispose of surplus farm products
would not be enough to achieve farm prosperity. He became
more interested in monetary and general economic policies.
Since 1921 he had been a vice-president of the Stable
Money League founded by the famous economist, Irving Fisher
of Yale University. Fisher and George F. Warren of Cornell
University advocated a "commodity dollar" instead of the gold
standard. Wallace was attracted to this idea because of the con-
sequences of tight money he could see in agriculture. The Stable
Money League later became the Stable Money Association. This
association (of which Franklin A. Delano, Franklin Roosevelt's
uncle, was chairman from 1929 to 1933), and especially member
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George Warren, had considerable influence in convincing FDR
to devalue the dollar.
Wallace was critical of the hard money policies of the
Federal Reserve Board in the early 1930s. In a leaflet he wrote in
1930 entitled "The Causes of the World Wide Depression of
1930," he urged the Federal Reserve Board to increase its buying
of bonds to expand the availability of bank credit. He ex-
pounded at length on the harm being done to farmers by the
decline in prices. He noted that the Federal Reserve authorities
had done their best to discourage stock speculation and could
hardly be blamed for the crash of 1929. He praised the board for
lowering rediscount rates and increasing bank reserves, but he
thought it was boo conservative and should do more. He was
farsighted, much more so than most of his contemporaries, but
he did not realize that what he called the depression of 1930
would turn out to be a depression of the 1930s, in part attri-
butable to timid and unimaginative monetary policy.
In his paper on causes of the depression, Wallace acknowl-
edged that there had been some sense in the Greenbacker-
Populist cries for free silver and soft money led by Weaver and
Bryan in the late nineteenth century. The declining price level
after the Civil War, which caused great suffering among
farmers, made the inflationist proposals "essentially sound in
the recognition of real human wrongs." Wallace was still
dubious about policies that could bring about continuous infla-
tion, but he had advanced his thinking beyond the gold-
standard dogmas of the past.
Henry Wallace was looking beyond the supply-
management problems of the farmer. In his essay on causes of
the depression, he of course did not neglect the Smoot-Hawley
tariff of 1930. He forecast correctly that it would lead to retalia-
tion and a general slowdown of international trade. He quoted
with approval a Swedish newspaper's comment that the new
tariff law was "the most terrible blow against the economic life
of the world." He listed the higher tariffs enacted in many Euro-
pean countries in response to Smoot-Hawlev.
Wallace wrote that there was justification for tariff protec-
tion for infant industries when the United States was young, as
advocated by Alexander Hamilton and Henry Clay, but the
modern American economy could not justify such protection.
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He quoted the older Republican philosophy as enunciated by
William McKinley, who said that whenever a product passed
under the control of a trust, it should be deprived of tariff pro-
tection. "The present-day Republicans," wrote Wallace, "are
radicals who have departed from the principles of the founding
fathers. Today we find the Republican party allowing great
trusts to use the tariff for price-fixing purposes."
In this essay, as in his other writings of the time, Wallace
showed that his concern for social justice and fairness was not
limited to the farming population. He worried about the jobless
factory workers and the consumers who would be hurt by an
undue rise in the cost of food—this at a time when farm prices
were collapsing. He was looking to the future. He saw danger in
the too rapid introduction of new technology which replaced
humans in the work force.
In all of his eight years as secretary of agriculture, Henry
Wallace was more than just the farmer's hired man in
Washington. He engineered and managed the greatest change in
the relatioship between farmers and government ever. He pro-
vided the opportunity for farmers to climb out of the depression
slough, and the farm people knew what he was doing for them.
But he also was a leading figure in the whole New Deal, con-
cerned with the whole society.
LOURING THE Hoover years, one of the farm relief plans con-
nected with the McNary-Haugen battles was given a tryout. A
Federal Farm Board was established in 1929 to buy up surpluses
and support prices. It had a fund of $250 million, and it proved
to be a failure. "The Farm Board experiment in sustaining wheat
prices," Henry Wallace wrote later, "was started at the worst
possible moment, although no one fully realized it at the time."
Farm leaders felt the Farm Board was a weak compromise to
avoid doing something more fundamental but were willing to
give the administration an opportunity to carry out its plan.
When wheat prices continued to slide in spite of the Farm
Board's buying and a similar operation by the Canadian wheat
pool, farm leaders turned toward production control.
W. J. Spillman of the Department of Agriculture, a prote'ge
of Harry Wallace, and several academic economists were work-
ing on a plan to cut farm production. Even Alexander Legge of
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the International Harvester Corporation, who was chairman of
the Farm Board, recognized the impossibility of supporting
prices without control of supply. John D. Black of Harvard,
M. L. Wilson of Montana State College, and Beardsley Ruml of
the University of Chicago were prominent in developing what
they called the Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan. This was
the basis for the Agricultural Adjustment Program in the New
Deal. Franklin Roosevelt became interested in the idea of con-
trolling farm production to meet demand, and in a campaign
speech at Topeka in September 1932, he advocated the essen-
tials of the domestic allotment plan. Wallace wrote in his most
famous book. New Frontiers, published in 1934, that Rexford
Tugwell, of the "brains trust," learned about the plan from
M. L. Wilson and explained it to FDR.
After the election, Roosevelt asked Wallace and other farm
leaders to meet with Marvin Jones, chairman of the House
Agriculture Committee, to see if something could be done on a
farm program by the lame duck Congress before the inaugura-
tion. That effort failed. When the new administration came into
power in March 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Act sailed
through rapidly and became law on May 12,1933. Wallace gave
high praise to the farm leaders who worked with him on passing
this legislation, especially Ed O'Neal of the Farm Bureau, "who
worked so unceasingly to heal the ancient breach between the
Democratic farmers of the South and the Republican farmers of
the Middle West."
The bill, Wallace wrote, was "the logical crystallization of
the long struggle for adequate farm legislation." He saw it as ex-
perimental. He said farming people were proceeding with con-
fidence and felt that Congress and the president would give
them new legislation or make repairs in the old if the act "did
not prove sufficiently powerful and flexible."
The AAA, with its allotments of crop acreages and hog
numbers, was widely supported by farmers and their organiza-
tions. The hard times farmers suffered during the postwar years,
culminating in the severe price collapse of the early thirties,
made conservative farmers desperate for action even if it in-
volved socialistic programs and government regulation.
Secretary Wallace surprised the country and probably
himself by demonstrating stout leadership and skillful admini-
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strative capacity. He organized the new AAA rapidly and went
into action immediately to cut the cotton crop for 1933 and the
wheat crop for 1934. About ten million acres of cotton, a fourth
of the total, were to be plowed under with the money to reim-
burse farmers coming from the new processing tax. Wheat
farmers had a poor crop coming on and little money coming in,
so the AAA decided to pay them benefits in advance if they
signed up for acreage reduction in 1934. These were revolu-
tionary moves that shook the nation.
Wallace wrote later that he had mingled feelings about the
plow-up campaign. "It was an amazing demonstration," he
wrote, "of what a united people can do because they know there
is no acceptable alternative. I could tolerate it only as a cleaning
up of the wreckage from the old days of unbalanced produc-
tion. Certainly none of us ever want to go through a plow-up
campaign again, no matter how successful a price-raising
method it proved to be."
The cotton plow-up caused only a tremor in public opin-
ion, however, compared with the slaughter of the sows and the
pigs in 1934. Wallace and his associates planned to cut corn
acreage and reduce the breeding of sows in 1934, but the effects
of that on farm income would be felt only late in the year or in
1935. Farmer committees in the corn belt suggested to Wallace
that the government buy up and slaughter five or six million
little pigs and two million piggy sows as an emergency measure.
The edible portions of the carcasses would be distributed to
families on relief.
The ensuing public uproar exceeded anticipation. Wallace
wrote, "Doubtless it is just as inhumane to kill a big hog as a
little one, but few people would appreciate that. They con-
tended that every little pig has the right to attain before
slaughter the full pigginess of his pigness. To hear them talk,
you would have thought that the pigs were raised for pets. Nor
would they realize that the slaughter of the little pigs might
make more tolerable the lives of a good many human beings
dependent on hog prices."
The slaughter plan was carried out, further dramatizing the
new administration's and Henry Wallace's willingness to violate
the conventional doctrines in order to give farmers relief. As it
turned out, the severe drought in 1934 did more to cut corn pro-
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duction than the acreage allotments. The slaughter of the pigs
speeded up an inevitable adjustment of pork production to feed
supply.
During the first years of government intervention into the
private business affairs of farm operators and owners—at a time
of continuing worldwide economic stagnation and high unem-
ployment—every step by the government was on unexplored
ground. There were fierce disputes in the Department of Agri-
culture and fierce disputes in the farming and business com-
munities. Very early it became apparent that processors, ship-
pers, and handlers of farm products would fight the production
limitations. Among the farm organization leaders, Wallace had
to contend with the cost-of-production price-fixing advocates
on the one hand and the McNary-Haugen export dumpers on
the other.
George Peek, the old McNary-Haugenite, was named first
administrator of AAA, with Charles J. Brand, a former USDA
official and later National Fertilizer Association executive, as
control plans. Peek had thought he should be named secretary
of agriculture. It was not a happy headquarters team, and
before 1933 ended, both Peek and Brand were gone. Wallace,
often called a dreamer and idealist, showed that he could be a
tough and practical administrator.
At a later time when Chester Davis was head of AAA, con-
flict arose between the managers of the adjustment program,
and liberal lawyers and social scientists in USDA who wanted to
do more for small farmers, hired farm workers, and black
people in the rural South. The Triple-A was led by people who
had worked with the major farm organizations and commercial
farmers, agricultural establishmentarians. They were primarily
concerned with supply adjustment; their critics, who had little
farming background, were more interested in social reform.
They objected to the sugar contracts, marketing agreements,
and other programs that they thought were benefiting the rich
at the expense of the poor. In the South, AAA contracts were
signed by the landlords who received the cash benefits. Tenants
sometimes did not get their fair share, and with cotton acreage
cut back, many were thrown off the land.
Jerome Frank, who headed the AAA legal division, wrote a
new interpretation of the cotton contracts making it illegal for a
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tenant to be displaced. Davis was out of Washington when this
was done. When he returned he was outraged and reversed
Frank's order. He told Wallace that the whole farm recovery
program would be harmed if the Frank order stood, since he
thought the cotton growers would pull out of AAA. He said
Frank, Gardner, Jackson, and several other members of the
AAA staff who were proteges of Rexford Tugwell and Felix
Frankfurter, would have to be fired. Wallace reluctantly agreed.
Philosophically, Wallace undoubtedly sided with the critics
of AAA. Both before he was secretary of agriculture and after-
ward, he was a champion of the poor and disadvantaged. It
must have galled him to realize that the AAA, while benefiting
the South as a whole, was making life more miserable for the
sharecroppers. But he didn't want to lose Chester Davis and he
wanted to keep plowing ahead toward the main goal of better
balanced agricultural production. If the Frank group had its
way, Wallace knew he would lose the support of the agricul-
tural main line, which he could not afford to do.
The ruckus over landless tenants helped to pave the way
for establishment of the Resettlement Administration which was
headed briefly by Rexford Tugwell, the intellectual leader of the
group which Davis fired. Later this became the Farm Security
Administration and now has evolved into the Farmers Home
Administration. Roosevelt appointed a committee on farm
tenancy, with Wallace as chairman, and this led to the
Bankhead-Jones Tenancy Act of 1937, providing funds for loans
to small farmers and displaced tenants. The concern for produc-
tion control and stabilizing income of commerical agriculture
was supplemented in the second New Deal term with more at-
tention to poor farmers, hired farm labor, and poor consumers,
although the commercial farm programs remained dominant
then as they have since.
The next crisis in the farm supply management program
came on January 6, 1936 when the Supreme Court declared the
Triple-A unconstitutional. The court, said Henry Wallace in his
book. Whose Constitution?, published later that year, had
denied agriculture the federar mechanism for coordinating pro-
duction. In an earlier radio speech, he said he had no quarrel
with the court's legal reasons but did have with the effects of the
decision on social justice.
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The court had ruled that the processing taxes which were
enacted to pay the cost of acreage adjustments were unconstitu-
tional. Wallace and his associates did not accept this decision as
removing all power of government to deal with farm over-
production. In a matter of days, the AAA was out on the road
explaining to farmers that the balanced production goal would
be sought through incentives to convert cropland to soil-
conserving uses. Wallace said that the Supreme Court had
"launched the soil conservation program probably two years
sooner than sound planning called for."
All along, Wallace had considered the original AAA pro-
gram to be a stopgap, to be replaced whenever conditions
allowed. In his book. New Frontiers, published in 1934, he
wrote: ' '
I would not mind seeing the processing tax and acreage control
abolished in 1936 if we have something better to take its place.
But unless we have built up greatly increased foreign purchasing
power by reducing tariffs, or unless we start loaning money out-
side the United States to enable foreign nations to buy our
surplus, I am afraid that dropping the processing tax and acreage
control in 1936 would result, with the ordinary run of weather, in
a repetition within a few years of the 1932 situation.
But when the blow fell, Wallace, and his staff came up with a
new Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Bill, which was
soon passed. The acreage reduction system went on about as
before, without the processing tax and with more emphasis on
soil conservation.
The county committees made up of local farmers proved
capable beyond expectations in administering the crop adjust-
ment programs. The complicated tasks of setting allotments,
making commodity loans, and checking compliance were per-
formed with remarkable smoothness and few complaints of un-
fairness. The Wallace theory that farmers would be more will-
ing to cooperate with neighbors than outsiders proved sound.
He was confident they would see that rules were obeyed. The
local committee system still is functioning, but on a more pro-
fessional basis. At the start, with six million farms in the
country, the committees were faced with mammoth, unfamiliar
jobs of information, explanation, and enforcement. Wallace
called it a new form of economic democracy.
As the experiment in supply management for agriculture
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proceeded through the 1930s, Wallace kept two goals in front of
farmers and the public. One was the long-term protection of soil
resources; the other was the idea of balance or stability which
he had written about so much in the twenties. He wanted
farmers to be able to adjust their market supplies to maintain a
fair income but not to gouge the consumer.
Actions following the drought of 1934, Wallace claimed,
showed that the Agricultural Adjustment Act was really an ad-
justment act and not just a reduction act. Drought wiped out the
surpluses of grain. What the AAA had planned to do in two or
three years, the drought did in one. But the adjustment in this
crude and haphazard way was disastrous to millions. Some-
thing was needed to smooth out the cycles. Even in late 1934,
after the worst drought in history, Wallace warned that without
control over acreage of corn in 1935, there would be a large ex-
pansion in plantings and danger of renewed surplus: The total
yield might amount to as much as 2.7 billion bushels. (That
seemed a tremendous crop in those days, long before the recent
eight-billion-bushel crops.) He did not want a cut in acreages,
but he warned against over-expansion, and a program was
needed for that.
That was not enough. An adjustable inventory of grain
also was required. Wallace advocated what he called an ever-
normal granary. What he meant, of course, was an ever-
afcnormal granary. In New Frontiers, he wrote:
We began to develop in our minds the idea that the government,
through the Commodity Credit Corporation, should not loan
money at the market price or above market price except in years
of large crops or undue price demoralization; and that during the
following year or the year thereafter, any surplus accumulated as
a result of loaning without recourse could be used effectively in
restoring a fair price, by the means I have described: that is, offer
it in lieu of benefit payments to farmers cooperating in acreage
control.
By this method, Wallace said, "We could prevent burdensome
supplies from accumulating, and the corn price from breaking
unduly, by using corn supplies, accumulated in years of large
crops, to reduce the acreage the following year."
Underlying the adjustment of supplies in the short run,
Wallace kept reminding the nation, was the necessity for long-
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range planning of soil and water resource use. He could become
quite lyrical in talking about the soil in nearly all his works, in-
cluding the book. Whose Constitution? He quoted Thomas
Jefferson that "soil is the mother of man" and spoke often of the
concern of the nation's early leaders for good care of the land.
He wrote of the difference between the soil conservation prob-
lems of the broad, continental United States and of Europe.
Europe does not suffer the sweeping winds and the variability of
rainfall that the Middlewest and Great Plains undergo.
Wallace said that "unfettered individualism results in ex-
ploitation of natural resources." But the Supreme Court said
farming is a local matter, Wallace noted with scorn, and asked,
"Is there no way for the capitalistic system to develop a
mechanism for taking thought and planning action?" He sug-
gested that the country might need a Council for the General
Welfare to speak up against special interests and parochial in-
terests on such matters as foreign trade, natural resource policy,
and agricultural stabilization policy. No one was more con-
scious of the emergency nature of many of the New Deal farm
policies, and no one was more anxious to convert to long-range
planning than Henry Wallace. He said the government should
develop "incentives to bring about the gradual and permanent
shift of excess plow land to grass and trees."
Henry Wallace was an unusual combination of farsighted
idealism and practical politics. Under his administration of the
Department of Agriculture, American farming was started on a
path toward parity—parity not in the narrow price-index sense
but in income, living conditions, and bargaining power—with
the nonfarm population. Wallace provided the vision and the
action for the realization of the goals of early American
leaders—that farming would not be a second-class occupation
or way of life.
The country had the good luck to bring to national leader-
ship a corps of people called New Dealers who could take a new
course in battling economic depression without ideological
blinders. Henry Wallace was the exemplary New Dealer; a
thorough pragmatist, he feared nothing but fear itself.
He opposed Roosevelt's recognition of Russia, because he
thought that it might encourage a revolt of the masses in Europe
who were suffering from the depression and would look upon
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the Soviet Union as a success. He came to believe later that
cooperation with the Soviet Union was essential to world peace,
but he never lost his skepticism about communism.
He was a devoted internationalist, but he was practical
enough to accept the nationalist McNary-Haugen plan as the
feasible way to farm relief. He strongly backed Cordell Hull's
trade agreements approach to lower trade barriers.
He hated race discrimination, but he went along with the
southern politicians in conduct of unequal farm programs in
order to get them started.
He worked to raise prices of farm products, but he was
always conscious of the danger of exploitation of the consumer.
The driving force behind Henry Agard Wallace was social
justice. The overriding problem of social justice from his point
of view in the 1920s and 1930s was the disadvantage of farming
people in a country increasingly dominated by corporate
business and unionized labor. He was an agrarian special-
interest advocate, to be sure, but not to the exclusion of other
interests. He was a person who truly believed that government
under our Constitution had a responsibility for the general
welfare.
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